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Served on several security 
committees and “big incident” 
response teams at UCB.
•




orked with Nick Buraglio
within ESnetto develop 
security controls tailored to the 
Science DMZ.
•






I have more recently been a bit concerned about how security is 
“done” in R&E.
–
Too much top-down policy and “control” orientation.  (This 




Lack of good risk assessment.
–
Failure to account for network functional needs (leading to 
Joe St. Sauver’sidea of a “Network Usability Officer).
–
Equating “controls” with “security.”
•
The Science DMZ has emerged out of a similar set of concerns, 





The big myth:  The main goal of the Science DMZ is to avoid 
firewalls and other security controls.
–
Leads to all sorts of odd (and wrong) claims like:
•
“Our whole backbone is a Science DMZ because there is 
no firewall in front of the backbone.”
•
“The Science DMZ doesn’t allow for anysecurity controls.”
•
“The Science DMZ requires a default-permit policy.”
–
The reality is that the Science DMZ emphasizes reducing 
degrees-of-freedom, reducing the number of network devices 
(including middleboxes) in the path, eliminating devices that 
can’t perform, and ensuring that the devices that remain in 









My goal is to break down this myth by viewing the Science DMZ 
as a security architecture.
•
That is, by thinking about Science DMZ as a form of security 
control, not just something that needs to be controlled.
•
At the same time, Science DMZ enables us to do a better job of 
risk-based security through segmentation.
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Identify risks (impact and likelihood over a period of time).
–
Identify and/or create controls that are specifically designed 
to mitigate those risks.
–




Select controls from a checklist or standard.
–
Controls are, or at one point were, believed to mitigate a 
general set of risks.
–
Apply controls (more controls==better security).
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Risk-based vs. Control-based Security
•
Most security experts prefer risk-based security
–
Control-based security: apply controls “because the standard 
says so.”
–
It’s actually hard to find, in the literature, anyone who likes or 
prefers control based security.
–
Broad application of firewalls (e.g. large border firewall), often 
viewed as control-based security.
•
So why do we still practice control-based security in many 
instances?
–
Risk based security is actually pretty hard.
–
Risk assessment itself is hard.
–
Determining if a risk is actually being mitigated is hard.
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Risk-based vs. Control-based Security
•
The non-falsifiability of security assessments (Microsoft 
Research paper):
–
Indicates difficulty with fully assessing risk (but also 
effectively dismisses control-based security).
–
In simple terms, it’s easy to find cases where a security 
breach w
ouldn’t have happened if a particular security control 
were in place, but it’s pretty much impossible to say that a 
security breach that didn’t happen, would have happened, if a 
security control hadn’t been in place.
–
Early days of firewall logging: “Our firewall prevented 
1,789,034 attacks last week!”
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Risk-based vs. Control-based Security
•








hat about all of the unknown unknowns?
–
“Nobody ever got fired for having a firewall.”
•
Moreover: The set of risks at a research lab or university 
cam
pus dem
onstrably vary across the resources that are 
attached to the network.
•







Think about your residence hall networks, business application 
networks, and the networks that are primarily in research areas.
•
The risk profiles are clearly different, so it makes sense to 
segment along these lines.
•
Your institution may already be doing this for things like HIPAA 
and PCI-DSS.  W
hy?  Because of the controls!
•
The Science DMZ follows the same concept, from a security 
perspective.
•
An example here is how using a Science DMZ to segment 
research traffic (especially traffic from specialized research 









I typically look at two examples:
–
Scenario 1: Scientific Instruments
–
Scenario 2: HPC clusters
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Scenario 1: Scientific Instrum
ents
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Scenario 2: HPC Clusters
•
Compute clusters may have specialized software for scheduling 
jobs or managing parallel nodes and resources.
•
Most nodes may be on private network.
•
















Scenario 2: HPC Clusters
•
In such a situation, your compute cluster should not also be your 
DTN.
•
Much easier to secure if you separate these functions.
•
Try to keep things as standard as possible on as many machines 
as possible.
•
Separation of functions allows for better risk-assessment and 
more carefully-tailored controls.
•
Controls should be matched to the thingthat you’re protecting.
•
Avoid one-offs if possible, but if you have to have them, make 
sure they’re well-designed, well-managed, and well-documented!
•






Think about what the Science DMZ is trying to do.
–
Improve performance, both by removing impediments and 










A lot of campuses are building ”distributed Science DMZs” or 




hen I think about the problems we are trying to solve, I still 
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